Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 11

Issue 2

Article 6

3-1-1988

AIDS in the Workplace: Termination, Discrimination and the Right
to Refuse
J Scott Kenney
Dalhousie University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons

Recommended Citation
J Scott Kenney, "AIDS in the Workplace: Termination, Discrimination and the Right to Refuse" (1988) 11:2
Dal LJ 581.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

J. Scott Kenney*

AIDS in the Workplace:
Termination, Discrimination
and the Right to Refuse

I. Introduction
"I heard one politician say in support of strict quarantine that the AIDS
virus has no civil rights. Perhaps not, but the human being infected with
that virus does."'
Not since the days of leprosy has there been a disease so feared and so
fatal as AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome). The lack of
knowledge about the disease has merely compounded the problem, so
that not only AIDS victims themselves, but also members of perceived
"high-risk" groups, face increasing discrimination in all facets of their
lives. This paper will focus on only one of these contexts: the workplace.
After a review of the current medical knowledge, two principal questions
wifl-be examined:
(i) What protection does the law give AIDS victims, or members of highrisk groups, against discrimination in employment?
(ii) What protection does the law give other employees when working
with an AIDS victim or members of a high-risk group?
These broad issues will be examined by reference to four different areas
of the law, including:
(i) The common law regulating individual contracts of employment;
(ii) Arbitration decisions under collective agreements;
(iii) Human rights legislation; and
(iv) Occupational health and safety legislation.
The principal focus in this paper will be the respective rights of victims,
high-risk groups, employers, and fellow employees under the human
rights legislation, the common law, arbitration jurisprudence, and
occupational health and safety legislation being merely illustrative of the
uncertain and inconsistent legal position these individuals face absent
strong amendments to human rights codes. Indeed, it will be shown that
many of these individuals, particularly those in a non-unionized
environment, can simply be terminated with notice and have no legal
redress. This calls for change.

* LL.B. Dalhousie, 1987.
1. TJ. Tomasi (1986), 28 Journal of Occupational Medicine 517.
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II. MedicalFacts
1. General
AIDS is a clinical syndrome first reported in Canada in February 1982,
eight months after it was described in the United States. It is characterized
by a loss or reduction of immune function due to infection by a fluidborne virus. The immune dysfunction results in the development of
2
opportunistic infections or malignancies, frequently resulting in death.
Homosexual or bisexual males continue to constitute the largest group
of cases (76 per cent), 3 although drug abusers who share needles,
recipients of blood or blood products, heterosexual partners (including
prostitutes) and persons of African or Haitian extraction have also been
reported.4 Overall, the cumulative incidence of AIDS in Canada as of
March 1986 was 19 per million population. 5 Ontario, Quebec and
6
British Columbia have reported 92 per cent of all cases.
The major risk activities for exposure to the AIDS virus include
receptive anal intercourse in homosexual males, needle sharing among
intravenous drug abusers and heterosexual intercourse with an infected
person. 7 Other modes of transmission include the transfusion of
contaminated blood or blood products and perinatal transmission by an
8
infected mother to her infant.
Transmission of the infection has not been seen in casual (non-sexual)
contact situations, as would occur in the workplace, school, or
household.9 There is no evidence of transmission in food or water, or by
airborne routes.' 0 Studies of family members of infected persons indicate
that the AIDS virus has a very low potential for transmission in nonsexual settings." Epidemiologic studies indicate that oral exposure to this
virus presents a low risk in comparision to rectal exposure, but data
indicating that there is no risk of infection are, as yet, incomplete. 12 All
such evidence indicates that fears of contracting AIDS on the job are
unfounded.

2. Canada Weekly Diseases Report Supplemen4 Dr. S.E. Acres, Ed, Health and Welfare
Canada, March 1986.
3. Id
4. Id
5. Id
6. Id.
7. Id
8. Id
9. Id
10. Id
11. Id
12. Id
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Although the incubation period for AIDS may be very long, current
estimates suggest that up to 10 per cent of infected persons are likely to
develop AIDS. 13 Between 20 and 25 per cent of patients infected with the
AIDS virus are symptomatic but do not meet the case definition for
AIDS. These individuals are seen to be suffering from AIDS-related
complex.14
Treatment of this disease can be divided into three broad approaches:
(i) treatment of the specific malignancies and infections associated with
AIDS, (ii) attempts at immune stimulation and reconstitution, and (iii)
antiviral therapy. 15 With or without treatment, however, AIDS remains
a fatal disease in most cases. 16 The overall case-fatality rate at any given
time is approximately 50 per cent and few patients survive longer than
three years from the time of diagnosis. 17
Because of this high mortality rate, much emphasis has been placed on
the control of the spread of the infection. Suggested measures include:
(i) The prevention of sexual transmissions (by limiting the number of
partners and encouraging the use of condoms for high-risk sexual
exposures);
(ii) The elimination of virus from blood, blood products, organs and
tissues used for donation (by screening, and non-acceptance of donors
form all high-risk categories);
(iii) The prevention of perinatal infection (see (i) above); and
(iv) The avoidance of blood exposure through needle sharing among
8
drug abusers.'
Commercial testing kits for AIDS are becoming available in Canada. 19
These utilize enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) technology
for detecting antibody to the virus. Although still being evaluated, four
ELISA kits and an immunofluorescent assay (IFA) kit have been released
for sale in Canada on a trial basis. 20 The number of assay kits is expected
to increase with the introduction of second generation kits and new
diagnostic products.
The existence of such technology ensures that some employers, at least,
will attempt to screen workers for AIDS before and during the
employment relationship. While this paper proceeds on the assumption
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id
I&
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
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that discrimination will take place on the basis of medical diagnosis, or
the perception that an employee has AIDS, medical screening does pose
a problem. It is the author's submission that this issue is best dealt with
by an examination of the law relating to drug testing, as the issues are
21
analogous.
2. The Workplace
The fear of AIDS found in the general public and fuelled by sensational
media coverage has invaded the workplace, causing extraordinary
tension and stress. Consider the following example:
A manager observes company cafeteria workers whispering in the
hallway. When she asks what the trouble is, they angrily reply that they
are afraid a co-worker has AIDS. The manager tries to reassure them, but
in the following days rumours spread. Suddenly, absenteeism among the
workers soars, and other company employees boycott the cafeteria. Nearhysterical family members call the office of the company president and
demand answers.2
The result of such a situation is likely to be termination of the
suspected victim. Absent any education of the real risk of contracting
AIDS, such scenarios are likely to be played over and over again.
But who are the individuals likely to face such actions?
Leonard 23 notes that persons infected with the AIDS virus do not
present a uniform profile in terms of their physical condition and
suitability for employment. Rather, based on current descriptions of the
disease, he has identified four categories of such individuals:
(i) Those who have been exposed to the virus but display no physical
symptoms;
(ii) Those who display symptoms characterized as "warning" symptoms
that AIDS may develop;
(iii) Those who have contracted an opportunistic infection indicating
development of the syndrome but who do not require hospitalization and
are physically able to work;
(iv) Those who have contracted multiple infections or require extended
hospitalization, or who have been so weakened by such infections and
24
the syndrome that they are relatively immobile.
21. It is possible, however, that if terminating or refusing to hire an AIDS victim because he/
she has AIDS is found to be discrimination against the handicapped, AIDS testing will
constituteprtimafaciediscrimination.
22. Rowe, M., Russel-Einham, R., and Baker, M. "The Fear of AIDS", Harvard Business
Review, July-August 1986, at 28.
23. Leonard, A., "Employment Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS" (1985), 10
University of Dayton Law Review 681.
24. Id, at 687. Reference to "AIDS victims" in this paper will refer to all of these groups.
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Discrimination in the workplace is most likely to be confined to
members of the first three groups,25 and those in high-risk groups in
general. It is not likely that an individual in the fourth category would be
capable of performing continued work, and would probably be receiving
payments under a health-care plan or some other form of income
protection.
11I. The Common Law Position
Any discussion of AIDS and AIDS hysteria in the workplace must have
reference to the common law regulating individual contracts of
employment. Two questions are of paramount importance here:
(i) To what extent can an employer be justified in terminating an
employee who has AIDS? and
(ii) To what extent can other employees rely on the common law to
provide them with a "safe" working environment - Le., one without an
AIDS carrier present?
Each will be dealt with in turn.
With reference to the first issue, the case law shows that, for indefinite
contracts of employment, an employee who suffers a permanent disabling
illness can be terminated without notice because the contract has been
frustrated. 26 Permanent illness destroys the consideration that the
employee offered in exchange for the employer's promise to pay wages,
as the employee will never again be able to perform his duties for the
employer. Temporary illness, on the other hand, will not frustrate the
contract of employment. This is based on the idea that illness is an Act
of God which cannot be foreseen or guarded against and so must be
forgiven on grounds of common humanity.27
But how long must an employee be off sick before the illness is no
longer considered temporary? There is little case law on this question in
Canada, but the leading English case, Marshallv. Harlandand WolffLtd
held 18 months not to be long enough.28 The court went on to list five
25. Especially the first group if AIDS testing in the workplace isinitiated on a wide scale.
26. DartmouthFerry Commission v. Marks (1903-4), 34 S.C.R. 366.
27. But note Heinburger v. Kingel (1931), 2 W.W.R. 539 (Sask. Dist. Ct.) which drew a
distinction between Acts of God which are extraordinary and cannot be foreseen or guarded
against and perils which arise in the ordinary scope of the employee's occupation or business.
The former can be excused on common humanity, the latter, not, and an employee injured in
the latter category will not be paid while ill. What about health-care workers who contract
AIDS on thejob?
28. (1972), I.C.R. 101 (Industrial Court). This was because the employer had not been paying
wages, sick pay or pension contributions, so there was no serious reason to treat the contract
as frustrated. Also, it had not been the company's policy to terminate employment on grounds
of sickness and there was no evidence that the employee was permanently incapacitated.
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factors which, by their presence or absence, would increase or decrease
the likelihood of frustration:
(a) the presence of a relatively short notice period;
(b) the fact that an entitlement to sick pay has expired (not conclusive as
a factor);
(c) a short expected duration for the employment in the absence of
sickness;
(d) the fact that the employee occupies a key post in which he must be
replaced on a permanent basis;
(e) the fact that the period of past employment is relatively short (Le.,
seniority brings about an increasing elasticity in the relationship
between the employer and employee so that29longer period of absence
due to sickness may be deemed acceptable).
Considering these factors, the court must then ask:
Was the employee's incapacity, looked at before the purported dismissal,
of such a nature, or did it appear likely to continue for such a period, that
further performances of his obligations in the future would be impossible
or would be a thing radically different from that undertaken by him and
accepted by him under the agreed terms of his employment? 30
However, where the employment contract is made for a specific
purpose, or for a fixed term, the tests is not that above, but whether the
illness prevents performance of the task 31, or of a significant part of the
32
term.
Finally, it must be pointed out that the concept of seniority found
33
under the collective-bargaining regime does not exist at common law.
Hence, although an employee off work due to temporary illness has the
right to return to work unless he is dismissed, he can definitely be
dismissed with due notice and has no right to replace another employee
who has been hired to replace him during his illness. The totality of the
job security an ill employee has at common law lies in the fact that illness
does not constitute just cause for summary dismissal.
But what relevance does all of this have for employees with AIDS?
The issue here is not so much whether he can continue to do the job, or
whether he is still useful to the employer, but whether the other
employees can safely work with him. Following the above precedents
literally would mean that an employee with AIDS could remain on the
29. Id, at 105.
30. Id, at 106.
31. Poussardv.SpiersandPond(1876),1 Q.B.D. 410.
32. Loates v. Maple (1903), 88 L.T. 288.
33. See: Low v. Toronto (1947), 2 D.L.R. (2d) 718 (Ont. C.A.). The reasoning of the court
implied that an employee had no right at common law to return to work after illness regardless
of how long the employee had worked for the employer concerned.
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job when not so ill as to require time off, and, so long as he is not
dismissed with notice, return to his job after a short bout of illness
(infection). The only argument that the employer may have for summary
dismissal is that AIDS is usually a fatal illness that, at present, has no
cure. Thus, while he can definitely fire the employee when the illness has
progressed to the stage where further performance of his contractual
obligations in the future would be impossible, or radically altered, he may
also be able to do so because an employee with AIDS will be
34
permanently incapacitated in the future.
But what of contagion? Although present medical knowledge indicates
that the disease cannot be passed through casual contact 3 5, there is much
that is still to be learned. In light of this, do fellow workers have any
common-law rights that protect them from working with AIDS carriers?
The answer to this question is both yes and no. Christie 6 writes that,
at common law:
The employer is obliged to provide his employees with safe tools and
equipment, a safe system of work and fellow employees who do not
foreseeably endangerthem 7 [Emphasis added]
This duty may arise either in tort or as an implied term of the
employment contract 3s, and would seem to cover infectious fellow
employees with AIDS.
It must be pointed out, however, that in most employment
relationships this implied duty of care is no longer relevant. Injured
employees now recover from no-fault worker's compensation funds,
under legislation that takes away their right to sue their employer. 39 Thus,
fellow employees, even in health care, could not sue their employer, in
contract or in negligence, for keeping an AIDS victim on the payroll and
requiring them to work with him.
Yet, there is one area where the employer's common-law duty with
regard to safety continues to be relevant to every employee, whether
covered by Worker's Compensation legislation or not. Christie writes:
Any employee may refuse to work in an unsafe situationand in doing so,
he does not give just causefor discipline or discharge. One way of stating
this legal result is to say that the employer's breach of his obligation, with
34. This question has not definitely been answered, but would seem to fit the doctrine of
anticipatory breach.
35. Supra, note 2.
36. Christie, I.M., EmploymentLaw in Canada,(Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) at 240.
37. Id, at 240 citingMarshmentv.Borgstrom, [1942] S.C.R. 374.
38. Hepple andO'HigginsEmployment Law, 3rd ed., (1979) at 24.
39. See, eg., the Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 343, s. 49. Note, however,
that domestic servants and agricultural workers are not covered by this legislation so the
common law duty of care may be relevant.
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regard to safety, releases the employee from his obligation to work and to
follow the reasonable orders of his employer... [But] if it is subsequently
establishedthat the work situationwas infact safe, the refusal to work may
well be held to have been unjustified.4 [Emphasis added]

The problem here is that present medical knowledge consistently finds
no risk of infection by casual contact with an AIDS victim. Unless it is
later discovered that there is indeed such a danger, such refusal to work
would constitute just cause for dismissal. This would apply equally to
health-care workers, so long as the employer was not ordering them to
expose themselves to infected blody fluids without proper precautions.
But unless precluded by Worker's Compensation Legislation, none of
the above limits the right of an employee, or customer, who has
contracted AIDS from another on the job to sue the other employee. For
example:
United States law supports liability where a person negligently exposes
another to a contagious or infectious disease and ... there have been
successful actions in negligence cases of the transmission
of herpes. Such
41
litigation in the AIDS context could well develop here.
Vicarious liability of the employer may be a possibility here as well,
especially in the health-care industry, if AIDS were communicated in the
course of employment and the employer was not following recommended safety procedures.
Thus, to sum up, it would appear that under the common law as it
now stands the employee with AIDS has just as much protection as any
other sick employee. Barring application of the doctrine of anticipatory
breach, the employer cannot summarily dismiss him until the illness
progresses to the point that further performance of his contractual
obligations becomes impossible. Moreover, on the medical knowledge as
it now stands, other employees cannot refuse to work with him (but may
be able to pursue an action in negligence if they actually contract the
disease).
But, in reality, this all begs the question of whether the employer
simply will not discharge the AIDS victim with proper notice. As already
pointed out42, this option is always open in a non-unionized workplace.
It is expected that different employers will take different actions here,
depending on their own knowledge and personal reaction, the strength of

40. Supra,note 36, at 241.
41. Report oftheAIDS Committee, Canadian Bar Association, April 25, 1986, at 61.
But consider how an employee would catch AIDS on the job. Also, consider whether or not
Workers' Compensation legislation would preclude such employee suits.
42. Supra.
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reaction by fellow employees (and customers, if relevant), and the

economic situation that the victim will face upon discharge.
If discharge is the chosen course, it must be pointed out that, as well

as any separation package he may receive, there are likely a number of
income-maintenance schemes available to the victim that will soften the
blow 43, making the decision easier. The availability of such schemes, if
coupled with an adverse personal staff and customer reaction, could

result in dismissal of the AIDS victim without any common-law recourse
on his part. If, however, the employer feels that the danger is minimal,

and it is best for the victim to remain on the job as long as possible 44,
under the present state of medical knowledge, at least, nobody can legally
stop him.
IV. ArbitrationJurisprudence

Nearly all collective agreements provide seniority and just cause
provisions giving the sick employee rights which differ from those

existing at common law. This is especially true in the area of job security.
However, in the area of refusal 'to work', arbitrators have also gone

further than the common law, upholding refusal to work where an
employee honestly and reasonably thought it was unsafe.45 The purpose
of this section is to examine to what further extent, if any, AIDS victims
and/or their co-workers are protected under the collective-bargaining

regime, if they file a grievance. However, it must be pointed out that,
unlike the common law, these precedents are not strictly binding, and
arbitrators may use their increased discretion to formulate entirely
different results in the AIDS context.
43. See: Della Risley, "An Introduction to the Position of the Sick Employee in Nova Scotia,"
(1979) 5 Dal L.J. 418, at 428-70 for an insightful discussion of such schemes.
44. In the U.S., for example, "a number of corporations, including Pacific Bell and Cigna
Insurance Company, are now allowing AIDS sufferers to stay on the job as long as their failing
health permits. Three years ago, when two Bank America employees in San Francisco flatly
refused to work with an AIDS victim, the company let the objectors resign and kept the disease
victim in his post. Says Nancy L. Menitt, a Bank America vice-president: 'We recognize the
therapeutic value of employees being allowed to work as long as they can.' At the San
Francisco headquarters of Levi Strauss, the blue jeans manufacturer, an AIDS victim who was
allowed to stay on the job as superior declares, 'I do not get the feeling here that I am a leper.'
Companies that decide to live with AIDS have generally succeeded in defusing the worries
of other employees by educating them on the difficulty of being infected by the disease on the
job. When two workers at the daily Portland Oregonian came down with AIDS last spring,
Personnel Director Frank Lesage called small meetings among 350 company employees to
discuss the issue and handed out literature on the disease. Says Lesage: 'They were not happy
with the news, but they were glad we were up front about our policy."' T7me, August 25, 1986,
page 50.
45. Brown and Beatty, CanadianLabourArbitration(2d), 1984, para 7:3621.
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To begin with, in arbitration decisions there is a distinction drawn
between just cause for dismissal in cases of discipline, and just cause for
dismissal in cases of illness. Depending on the reason behind the
dismissal, different factors are to be taken into consideration. 46 In
addition, different considerations are brought to bear depending on
whether the illness results in excessive intermittent47 , long term45 , or
permanent4 9 absenteeism. Each of these will be considered in turn.
The case of Re United Automobile Workers and Massey-Ferguson
Ltd 50 states that innocent absenteeism due to illness is not a ground for
discipline and hence cannot constitute just cause for dismissal under the
collective agreement. Yet, excessive intermittent absenteeism may be just
cause in a non-punitive sense, as with an employee who is frequently
absent and is not performing his part of the employment contract.
In order to demonstrate this excessive absenteeism, the employer must
prove:
(i) undue absenteeism in the employee's past record 51 , and
(ii) the fact that the employee is incapable of regular attendance in the
future.
If there is no probability that there will be a change in the employee's
absenteeism in the forseeable future, there is just cause for termination. If,
on the other hand, there is chance of change the employee may be
reinstated on a provisional basis. 52 Brown and Beatty note that:
In such cases, arbitrators have generally required that there be some
a
culminating or final incident justifying a response by the employer, as 53
condition precedent to terminating or altering their employment status.
Once this has been found:
Arbitrators will then test the propriety of [the employer's] response by
examining the past absenteeism record of the grievor and assessing the
capability of the employee to report for work on a regular basis in the
future. By focussing on such criteria as the past employment record of the
grievor, the nature of and causes for the absences in the past, the
46. Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd v. Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers (1975), 11
N.S.R. (2d) 552 (N.S.S.C.,A.D.).
47. Supra, note 43.
48. Supra, note 43.
49. Supra, note 43.
50. (1969), 20 L.A.C. 370.
51. See: United Automobile Workers, Local 195 and Admiral Steel Products Ltd (1967),
18 L.A.C. 417, where it was held that the arbitrator can consider absences due to causes other
than illness along with illness absences.
52. See" Re United Automobile Workers, Local 458 and Massey-Ferguson IndustriesLtd
(1972), 24 L.A.C. 344.
53. Supra, note 45.
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persistence of the attendance problem, the effect of earlier company
attempts to rectify it, the frequency and duration of the absences, as well
as any medical prognostication as to the likelihood of the grievor's ability
to report on a regular basis, the arbitrator attempts to make a reasoned
judgement as to the grievor's ability to fully discharge his employment
obligations in the future 4
Where the employee suffers a long-term illness, in contrast to the more
intermittent kind discussed above, Risley55 states that this:
... can also constitute just cause for dismissal but here the just cause is
established by looking at factors other than the employer's need for an
employee to do the job. Arbitrators instead consider such factors as:
(a) the length of time for which an employee can collect money under a
sick pay plan;
(b) the ability of the employee
to attend regularly in the future; and
56
(c) seniority provisions.

Thirdly, when the illness is neither intermittent nor long term but
clearly permanent, the employee may be dismissed 7 This is much the
same as the common-law position regarding frustration in cases of
permanent illness. However, unlike the common law, it is possible that a
seniority clause can protect an employee who may be permanently
disabled for some work, but able to perform other work available at the
58

workplace.

In all of the above situations, most arbitrators have required the
employer to bear the onus of establishing the reasonableness of its
prognosis for the employee's future attendance.5 9 In order to provide such
proof the employer is legally empowered to require the employee to
submit to a medical examination. 60 Indeed, in Re MartindaleSash and
DoorLtd and UnitedBrotherhoodof Carpentersand JoinersofAmeric,
Local 802,61 Chairman Fox stated that:

54. Supra,note 45. See also: CanadaPost Corp. (982), 6 L.A.C. (3d) 238, where it was held
that where there is clear evidence that the cause (or causes) of an employee's illness has been
or is in the process of being removed or cured, his past record notwithstanding, his prospects
for future attendance are sufficiently positive to warrant his continued employment.
55. Della Risley, "An Introduction to the Position of the Sick Employee in Nova Scotia,"
(1979) 5 Dal LJ. 418.
56. Id, at 426.
57. Re United Electrical Workers Local 523, and Page-Hersey Tubes Ltd (1962),
13 L.A.C. 289.
58. Re UnitedAutomobile Workers Local 399, and Anaconda American Brass Ltd (1966),
17 L.A.C. 289.
59. General Tire CanadaLtd (1982), 7 L.A.C. (3d) 238.
60. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories) 1982,
5 L.A.C. (3d) 248.
61. (1973), 1 L.A.C. (2d) 324.
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... an employer now seems to have a limited rightand duty to demand that
an employee undergo a medical examination if he has reasonable and
probablegroundsfor suspecting thatthe employee:
(i) is a source of dangerto himself, other employees or company property,
or

(ii) is unfit to perform his duties.
If an employee refuses to submit to a medical examination or refuses to
produce a medical certificate ...

dismiss the employe.

62 [Emphasis

then the employer has just cause to

added]

If such evidence demonstrates that the employee will probably be
incapable of regular attendance in the future, the termination will not
likely be disturbed. However, the result might be different where the
medical opinion shows the employer's prognosis to be unsupported, in
63
error, or not bonafide.
Finally, Brown and Beatty note that, in addition:
... not only must undue absenteeism in the grievor's past record and an
incapacity for regular attendance in the future be shown, but arbitrators
may also require that the employer prove that it has acted fairly and
without discrimination towards the grievor by demonstrating that, as
against other employees in the plant or in comparison to others as
described in the reported awards, he has been treated equitably. Although
not obliged to prove that the grievor's attendance record is the worst in the
plant on some precise mathematical formula, it has nevertheless been held
that an employer has a positive obligation to show that, as against some
reasonable standard, the grievor's record warranted the action taken.64
Thus, arbitrators prefer not to sustain the termination of employees
who, while having a considerable absenteeism record, have a bona fide
one as well. Something more is needed, for example, an element of fault
or volition, putting the absenteeism, at least, partly in the employee's
6
control.
But what of AIDS? One interpretation of the above jurisprudence
would hold that an employee with AIDS who was absent from work
intermittently, through no fault of his own, could remain on the job so long as these absences were not undue. At the point that his condition
rendered him incapable of regular attendance in the future, the
culminating event required for terminating or altering his employment
66
status would be reached.
62. Id Quare whether this means that an employee with AIDS could be terminated as a
source of danger to other employees. Further, would it result in high risk groups being
terminated because they refused to submit to a medical examination.
63. Queensway GeneralHospitalAssociation.(1979), 24 L.A.C. (2d) 149.
64. Supra, note 45.
65. Norton Co. of CanadaLtd (1977), 14 L.A.C. (2d) 60.
66. However, an important question to ask here is how far in the future must this condition
of incapacity be for there to be just cause for termination?
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More likely the first stage will be bypassed completely and the
employee's AIDS infection characterized as long term, or, in light of
present medical knowledge, permanent. Seniority provisions may protect
he employee for a time, in that he may be reassigned to other work he is
capable of in the workplace, but, if the medical evidence indicates that he
is incapable of attending regularly in the future, and he is somehow able
to collect sick pay for a reasonably long period, it is likely that he will be
seen as having been terminated with just cause.
The only argument a physically capable AIDS victim may have in
such a situation is that, as against other employees in the plant, or in
comparison to others described in the reported awards, he has been
treated inequitably. He may argue that not his record, but infection,
which medical evidence shows cannot be passed by casual contact, was
the sole motivation of the employer. Thus, against these reasonable
standards, the employer's action was unwarranted. It is, as yet, too soon
to tell how much credence will be given to such an argument.
Turning now to the second issue, viz., to what extent arbitration
jurisprudence protects fellow employees from working with AIDS
victims, it is perhaps true to say that fear for one's personal health and
safety is the most common reason that employees refuse to obey a
superior's orders. It has been held that an employee may not be
disciplined or discharged for refusing to do work that he honestly and
reasonably thought to be unsafe. 67 The test used in cases of this sort
focuses on four issues:
First, did he honestly believe his health or well-being was endangered?
Secondly, did he communicate this belief to his supervisor in a reasonable
and adequate manner? Thirdly, was his belief reasonable in the
circumstances? Fourthly, 68
was the danger sufficiently serious to justify the
particular action he took?
Most cases that go to arbitration center on the third issue: the
reasonableness of the employee's belief that the assignment was unsafe.
69
This never depends on whether the assignment was, in fact, safe or not.
On the contrary, an objective standard is used:
Whether the average employee at the workplace, having regard to his
general training and experience, would, exercising normal and honest
judgement, have reason to believe
that the circumstances presented an
70
unacceptable degree of hazard.
67. Supra, note 45, para 7: 3621. However, if the belief is later found to be unreasonable on
the standard given, the employee will be liable to discipline or discharge.
68. Steel Co. of CanadaLtd (1973), 4 L.A.C. (2d) 315.
69. Eastern Steel Casting. (1981), 28 L.A.C. (2d) 310. Thus, medical evidence of safety is
irrelevant.
70. Pharandel.a. v.Inco Metals Co. (1980), O.L.R.B.R. 980.
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Various factors are looked at in particular cases to apply this or
analogous standards; eg., whether other employees have been willing to
perform the work 71; whether the belief was founded on a medical
condition peculiar to himself72 ; the character of the particular job in the
context of the specific work environment 73 , repugnancy and unpleasantness including more subtle forms of sexual harassment74, or fear of minor
injury 75; an employee's inexperience on the particular job76; or an
employee's personal psychological fear 77. In all of these circumstances,
the employee takes the chance that an arbitrator will determine his belief
7
to be unreasonable, the refusal improper, and the discipline justified.
Following these examples, perhaps employees who refuse to work
with another because he has, or is suspected of having AIDS, could
justify this in situations where other employees refuse as well, where they
have a medical condition or status rendering them particularly susceptible
to AIDS (such as some members of high-risk groups) or where they have
a personal psychological fear (such as hypochondria). Three things must
be pointed out however.
First, employers and arbitrators will have to be ever vigilant to prevent
the possibility that any of these claims, perfectly reasonable on their face,
are not used as a smokescreen by dishonest employees who simply do not
want to work with an AIDS victim or member of a high-risk group.
Secondly, the first of these possibilities, the reasonableness of the
refusal to work being supported by the concurrent actions of other
employees, may be possible when arbitration decisions are looked at in
isolation, but, when occupational health and safety legislation is
considered, which covers many more employees besides those covered by
collective agreements, the same result is not forthcoming.79
Thirdly, since it is commonly accepted by arbitrators that inability to
get along with a fellow employee is grounds for discipline80 , refusal to
work with an AIDS victim, or a member of a high-risk group, may well
justify disciplinary action.

71. GreatCanadian Oil Sands (1979), 22 L.A.C. (2d) 426.
72. BurnsFoodsLtd. (1977), 16 L.A.C. (2d) 377.
73. Steel Co. of Canada.(1975), 8 L.A.C. (2d) 375.
74. CUPE (1982), 4 L.A.C. (3d) 385. These were held not to constitute unsafe or hazardous
conditions, and such circumstances do not justify a refusal to perform work.
75. Id
76. Supra,note 73.
77. Id
78. Liquid CarbonicCanadaLtd (1975), 9 L.A.C.. (2d) 52.
79. Infra.
80. Supra,note 45 at para. 3580.
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Thus, it seems that, absent new developments, arbitration jurisprudence affords ever so slightly more protection than the common law,
both with regard to the employee suffering AIDS or AIDS discrimination in termination, and to those fellow employees wishing to avoid
contact with them. Seniority provisions may protect an AIDS victim's
job a little longer than the common law (under which he could be simply
dismissed with due notice), he could be reassigned until his illness
incapacitates him completely, and, if terminated, he may be able to argue
that he was treated inequitably relative to the other employees.
High-risk groups, in addition, may be able to shelter under the
decisions allowing discipline for the inability of others to get along with
them. As for the fellow employees, they may be able to refuse to work
with an AIDS victim on certain narrowly prescribed grounds, but these
provide fertile ground for deception, and, in the end, may be overridden
by occupational health and safety legislation.
V. HumanRights Legislation
Human rights legislation is perhaps the area of law that affords the most
hope for AIDS victims facing discrimination in employment. Three
issues must be dealt with in this context:
(i) Whether human rights codes offer protection against discrimination to
people who, while not AIDS victims themselves, are perceived as being
in high-risk groups;
(ii) Whether the prohibition of discriminating against the handicapped in
human rights legislation protects AIDS victims in the employment
setting; and
(iii) Whether discrimination under (i) and/or (ii) above is likely to be
saved because the employer's or fellow employee's actions relate to a
bonafide occupational qualification.
Dealing with the first issue, it has become clear that three groups have
a particularly high risk of AIDS: individuals of Haitian or African origin,
intravenous drug abusers, and homosexuals. Haitians and individuals of
African origin may well face a new round of racial discrimination due to
AIDS. As for drug abusers, it may be argued that part of the increasing
popularity of employee drug testing may actually be motivated, if only in
part, by the fear of AIDS. Lastly, with reference to homosexuals, it has
been noted that in 1985 in the State of New York, work-related AIDS
discrimination complaints went up 500 per cent; this was characterized
by gay rights activists as "de facto discrimination against homosexuals." '81
81. "New York Business Group Suggests Employees With AIDS Be Forced to Work at
Home", Job Safety and Health Report, v. 15, no. 25, December 10, 1985, at 196.
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What can Canadian human rights legislation do for the individuals in
these groups? Gandz and Rush 2 note that:
With very few exceptions, it can be generally stated that discrimination on
the basis of race, ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, marital status, and
physical handicap, is prohibited in all eleven jurisdictions. Some
jurisdictions also prohibit discrimination on the basis of a record of
criminal offences (Federal, B.C., Ont.) or political beliefs (B.C., Man.,
Que., P.E.I.). Ontario prohibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship,
and Quebec
prohibits discrimination on the basis of language and social
83
condition.
Discrimination on these prohibited grounds is illegal at all stages of the
employment relationship: advertising the position, application forms,
interviews, hiring, promotion and dismissal.8 4 In addition, the B.C.
Human Rights Code s5 and s. 15 of the CanadianCharterof Rights and
Freedoms 6 , have open-ended definitions of discrimination that could
well encompass new areas.
Thus, with reference to the first group, Haitians or individuals of
African origin, it would appear that refusal to hire, termination, or
anything in-between, would primafaciebe covered by the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic origin, citizenship (Ontario),
and/or colour. They need only apply to the human rights commission in
87
their local jurisdiction and make their case.
The second group, intravenous drug abusers, is not so lucky. None of
the standard listed provisions apply. The only argument that they could
make, if coming under Ontario, B.C., or federal jurisdiction, is that they
have been discriminated against because of a record of past criminal
offenses; of course, none of this would matter if "not having AIDS" were
to be a bona fide occupational requirement, which will be discussed
88
later.

82. J. Gandz and J.C. Rush., "Human Rights and the Right Way to Hire", Business Quarterly,
Spring 1983, at 70-77.
83. Id, at 71-2. It must also be pointed out that Quebec and Ontario have added sexual
orientation to the list of prohibited grounds (S.Q. 1977, c. 6., s. 1; S.O. 1986, c. 64, s. 18).
84. Supra, note 8, at 72. This affords a wider scope than the common law and arbitrations,
which deal primarily with discipline and discharge.
85. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 186., s. 3.
86. CanadianCharterof Rights andFreedoms, ConstitutionAct 1982,s. 15(1).
87. Although the employer may wish to argue that it was none of these factors, but rather, fear
of AIDS that prompted discrimination, it is not likely that such arguments will carry much
weight, since effect, not discriminatory intention, is looked at primarily by the Boards. Ontario
HumanRights Commission andO'Malley. v. Simpsons Sears Ltd (1986), 7 C.H.R.R. D/3102
(S.C.C.)
88. Infra.
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But the real focus here must be on homosexuals. At present, they are
not protected from discrimination in any jurisdictions save Quebec and
Ontario.8 9 Interesting questions arise, however, as to whether the
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex, the open-ended
provision in B.C., or the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms will
offer them any protection.
The issue of whether or not human rights legislation, prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sex, applies to homosexuals appears to
have been already decided. In Re Board of Governors of the University
of Saskatchewan et aL and Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission90
it was stated that the word "sex" in its normal meaning refers to the
gender of a person, not to his sexual activities or propensities unless it
appears in a context which would suggest another meaning. Since it was
used in its normal meaning in the legislation 9 , the prohibition of
discrimination in employment on the basis of sex was held not to apply
when an employer refuses to employ a person in a certain position
because of that person's homosexuality and his publishing of that fact.
Secondly, as to whether open-ended prohibitions of discrimination,
such as found in the B.C. Human Rights Code, will protect homosexuals,
this point appears to have been already decided in Gay Alliance Towards
Equality v. Vancouver Sun.92 . There, a homosexual organization was not
permitted to place an advertisement in the Vancouver Sun due to the
editorial policy of the newspaper. It complained to the human rights
tribunal, arguing that this was contrary to s. 3 of the code which reads:
3 (1)

No person shall:

(a) deny to a person or class of persons any accommodation, service, or
facility customarily available to the public; or
(b) discriminate against a person or class of persons with respect to any
accommodation, service, or facility customarily available to the
public, unless reasonable cause exists for the denial of
discrimination.

(2)

For the purposes of subsection (1),
(a) the race, religion, colour, ancestry or place of origin of a person or

class of persons shall not constitute reasonable cause; and
(b) the sex of a person shall not constitute reasonable cause unless it
relates to the maintenance of public decency or to the93determination
of premiums or benefits under contracts of insurance.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

S.Q. 1975, c. 6,s. 10 as am. by S.Q. 1977, c. 6., s. 1; S.O. 1986, c. 64,s. 18.
(1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 561. (Sask. Q.B.).
The FairEmployment PracticesAc, R.S.S. 1965, c. 293, as am. by SS. 1972, c. 43, s 4.
(1979), 2 S.C.R. 435.
Supra, note 85.
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Although the human rights tribunal initially found in their favor, this
decision was eventually overturned after going all the way to the
Supreme Court of Canada. There, it was stated that the refusal to publish
was not based on a personal characteristic of the appellant, but upon the
content of the advertisement itself, which the newspaper had the right to
control under the concept of a free press.
It must be pointed out, however, that this case did not categorically
decide that homosexuals have no rights under the B.C. legislation. J.E.
Jefferson 94 takes the view that it was largely decided on freedom of the
press, and points to the dissenting judgement of Dickson J. (as he then
was) where it was stated:
The British Columbia Code is silent as to sexual orientation, but it is
precisely because the British Columbia Code goes well beyond it's
counterparts in other provinces that the present case got before the board
of inquiry. The absence of sexual orientationfrom the list of specifically
proscribed forms of discrimination may indicate a lesser-degree of
protection in the weighing of reasonable cause, but it must be emphasized
that there is no necessary limitation on "reasonablecause" to be read into
the statute by the mere absence of reference to sexual orientation.95
[Emphasis added]
Such arguments are used by Jefferson to favour an interpretation of
s. 15(1) of the Charter that would strike down laws or application of
laws that discriminate in the basis of sexual orientation. 96 However, no
cases have been reported on this issue, as yet.
Finally, it is important to note that the Canadian Bar Association, in
an AIDS report that was adopted by the national body by resolution 97,
has stated that:
...discrimination against those infected or perceived infected could take
place with impunity under the guise of discrimination against
homosexuals. Currently, there is no remedy under federal or Ontario
human rights legislation.
We are not unaware of the sensitive and controversial nature of the
issue, but we do note that the federally commissioned report, Equality
Now, has recommended that discrimination on grounds of sexual
94. J.E. Jefferson, "Gay Rights and the Charter" (1985), 43 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 70.
95. Supra, note 92 at 461.
96. Supra, note 94. It must be pointed out however, that both the B.C. Human Rights Code
and the Charter would have very little impact on employment discrimination against
homosexuals, even if favorable interpretations were made. S. 3 of the Code refers to "any
accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public," which would seem to
exclude employment, while the application of the Charter is probably limited to laws or
applications of laws that discriminate. Although some controversy exists on this issue, up till
now private discrimination has not been covered by the Charter.
97. Report of the AIDS Committee, Canadian Bar Association (Ont.), Apr. 25, 1986. Note
that this was written before the amendment to the OntarioHuman Rights Code.
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orientation be prohibited at the federal level. In light of the serious risk
that discriminationagainst homosexuals has and which will escalate as a
direct result of public fears about AIDS, we recommend that sexual
orientationbe added to the list ofprohibited grounds of discrimination in
both federal andprovincialhuman rights legislation..98 [Emphasis added]
Thus, subject to common-law notice requirements and just cause
protection under collective agreements, it would appear that, except for
persons of Haitian or African origin, and homosexuals residing in Quebec
and Ontario, members of AIDS high-risk groups will have a difficult
time, at the very least, in proving discrimination under human rights
legislation. Homosexuals, being the largest group, have the most to lose
from the present state of the law, and unless this is changed per the
recommendations of the AIDS committee, can be discriminated against
by employers at will.
Turning now to a discussion of AIDS victims themselves, the primary
question to be asked is whether such workers are protected from
discrimination on the basis of handicap or physical disability. This issue
first arose in the U.S. case of Arline v. The School Board of Nassau
County99 , and has remained persistent ever since. In that case, a teacher
with AIDS, who was fired from her job because of her susceptibility to
tuberculosis, brought action alleging that her dismissal violated the 1973
RehabilitationAct. Section 504 of that act provided that:
•..No otherwise qualified handicapped individual shall, solely, by reason
of his handicap, be excluded from participation and, be denied benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance. 10°
The court held that, looking at the overall statutory language, it was
clear that persons with contagious diseases fit into the definition of
handicapped individual therein. First, the court stated:
As the record of this case makes clear, a person with tuberculosis is, when
afflicted with the disease, one who "has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits ... major life activities," 29 U.S.C.*

706 (7) (B); 45 C.F.R.* 84.3 (j)(2)(i)(A), since the disease can
significantly impair respiratory functions as well as other major body
systems. Even when not directly affected by tuberculosis, Arline falls
within the coverage of section 504 because she "has a record of such
impairment", 45 U.S.C.*84.4 (j) (2) (iv), by her employer. 0 1
Secondly, it must be pointed out that "physical or mental impairment"
98. Id
99. 772 2d. 759 (1985) (U.S. Ct. of Appeals, 11th Circuit, Atlanta).
100. RehabilitationAct, 1973,** 2 et seq. 504, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. **701 et seq., 794.
101. Supra, note 99 at 764.
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had been defined in regulations promulgated by the Department of
Health and Human Services:
(1) Physical or mental impairment means (A) any physiologicaldisorder
or condition, cosmetic disfiguremen. or anatomicalloss affecting one or
more of the following body systems: neurological; muscoskeletal; special
sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular;
reproductive; digestive; genito-urniary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and
endoctrine; or (B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities. 102 [Emphasis added]
This definition, reviewed by the court in Arline, is equally applicable
to persons with AIDS. Physical disability in such cases could be seen as
a physiological condition affecting the hemic and lymphatic system itself,
or, on the above reasoning concerning tuberculosis, as any disease caught
by the AIDS victim as a result of his reduced immune function.
Finally, the court noted that:
Congress failure to exclude contagious disease from coverage when it
specifically excluded alcoholism and drug abuse implies that it harbored
no similar disapproval about them. 103
Thus, the court concluded that Miss Arline had been discriminated
against on the ground of physical disability contrary to s. 504 of the
RehabilitationAcL 1 4
The relevance of this case for Canadian employees with AIDS would
appear to depend, largely, on the similarity in statutory language here.
Again, summarizing the U.S. position, Leonard notes:
The most common terminology is contained in the federal law and
repeated, with minor variations, in pertinent laws or regulations in thirteen
jurisdictions, defining a "handicapped" person as one who "has a physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities." The Rehabilitation Ac. andtten of the
thirteen jurisdictions, also expressly extend coverage to those not presently
disabled but who have a "record of such impairment". Some jurisdictions
go on to define "major life activities" in terms of physical actions typical
of a normal, healthy existence, emphasizing use of the senses, locomotion,
and rational thought; but these "list" functions (which do not mention
immune function as a major life activity) are, from their context, clearly
102. 45 C.ER.* 84.3 (j)(2)(i)(A).
103. Supra, note 99 at 764. This would leave a major high-risk group for AIDS without
protection under U.S. law.
104. Id However, since the district court had made no finding as to whether the risks of
infection precluded Miss Arline from being "otherwise qualified" for her job, and if so whether
it was possible to make some reasonable accommodation for her in that teaching position, in
another position teaching less susceptible individuals, or in some other kind of position in the
school system, the case was remanded for further findings.
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not meant to be exhaustive or exclusive. Some of the laws further define
"impairment" in terms of various organs and body systems, and such
definitions usually include reference to the hemic (blood) and lymphatic
systems, Le. - the central organs of the immune function.05 [Emphasis
added]
In Canada, human rights legislation in each jurisdiction say that every
person has the right not to be discriminated against in employment with
respect to handicap. 10 6 The statutory definition of "handicap" is
essentially uniform across the country 0 7, stated as:
any degree ofphysical disability,infirmity, malformation or disfigurement
that is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness and, without limiting
the generality of the foregoing, including diabetes mellitus, epilepsy, any
degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical co-ordination, blindness
or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, muteness or speech
impediment, or physical reliance on a dog guide or on a wheelchair or
other remedial appliance or device'08 . [Emphasis added]
Despite the differences in statutory language between Canada and the
U.S., this definition is very broad, and it is very possible that "any degree
of physical disability ... that is caused by ... illness" could be
interpreted to extend protection to AIDS victims. Unlike the U.S.
provisions, there is no listing of major normal life activities, but rather,
their converse: characteristics of handicapped individuals. Yet in-neither
case are these lists meant to be more than illustrative, and the words
"without limiting the generality of the foregoing" clearly indicate that the
courts will be open to new submissions as to what constitutes a handicap.
Also, although the Canadian definition contains no reference to the
hemic or lymphatic systems, the rationale of the decision in Arline and
the generality of the statutory language here certainly leaves plenty of
room for argument. Thus, it can be safely stated that there is nothing in
the Canadian human rights legislation that would prevent a wide
interpretation of handicap from being made, thereby offering protection
to persons with communicable diseases and AIDS.

105. Leonard, A.S., "Employment Discrimination Against Persons With AIDS (1985), 10
University of Dayton Law Review 681, at 691.
106. C. Elliott and S. Saxe, "Aids in the Workplace: A Lawyers's Point of View", The
Employment Law Report, January 1986, 1.
107. See, eg., the OntarioHuman Rights Code, R.S.O. 1980, c. 340, as am. by R.S.O. 1951,
c-53 s 9(b)(i); the CanadianHuman Rights Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 33, as am. by 1980-81-8283, c. 143 s. 65.1(3); the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11 as am. by S.N.S.
1974, c 46s. 11B(2).

108. Id Note also that the Ontario legislation expressly extends protection not only to those
with an existing or past handicap but also to those who are "believed to have or have had an
existing or past handicap". Will this help high-risk groups?
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However, there may be problems brewing at the interpretive source, as
it were. Recently, the U.S. Justice Department ruled that some employers
may legally fire AIDS victims if their motive is to protect other
workers. 10 9 In a 49 page opinion, which the executive branch is bound to
follow in dealing with complaints of discrimination, Assistant Attorney
General Charles J. Cooper wrote that discrimination based on the
physical disability caused by AIDS might be a violation of the law, but
the Rehabilitation Act does not restrict measures taken to prevent the
spread of the disease. 110
The result is an anomaly of sorts: an AIDS victim whose abilities are
impaired may have protection against dismissal, but a fully functioning
AIDS carrier may not - as long as dismissal is based on a fear of
contagion. The ruling suggested an AIDS carrier wouldn't qualify as
handicapped, and hence would have no legal basis for challenging
discriminatory acts under the 1973 statute."'I
It is too soon to tell whether the diminution or absence of immune
function found in AIDS victims will be interpreted to be a handicap
under the Canadian human rights legislation, the above comments
notwithstanding. It is a possibility, considering the reasoning of the Arline
case, the wide statutory language involved, and, also, present medical
evidence on contagion. It will not be a probability, however, if the fear
of AIDS prompts more rulings like that of the U.S. Justice Department.
Yet, even if AIDS victims or high-risk groups manage to establish that
they have been discriminated against under human rights legislation,
employers and other employees may still be able to justify it on the
standard of a "bonafide" occupational qualification. Thus, this possibility
must be examined.
Gandz and Rush discuss this exception as follows:
In its simplest form, an employer may discriminate on a prohibited ground
when it is necessary to do so. In the legislation, this exception is usually
expressed as a "bonafide occupational qualification." This exception has
both subjective and objective aspects. There must be no intention to
arbitrarily discriminate and, as well, the requirement for employment must
have a rational, reasonable basis. In other words, the decision must be
based on valid measurements of those personal characteristics or attributes
which can be demonstrated to be related to effective job performance. So,
for example, most jurisdictions would allow discrimination against
109. Newsweek, July 7, 1986, page 62.
110. Id This could result in many people being terminated if testing for AIDS antibodies
becomes common.
I 11. Id Note also the California LaRouche proposal to give state official broad powers to
contain the disease, including quarantine. This was submitted to voters in the November, 1986
Congressional elections, but defeated.
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women if the vacancy was for a dancer in a male strip show112or an
application for a vacant post for a rabbi could be restricted to Jews.
Recent cases on bona fide occupational qualifications do not bode well
for AIDS victims or members of high-risk groups. First, in Bhinder and
CanadianHuman Rights Commission v. C.N.R. 13 , a case where a Sikh
refusing to wear a hard hat because of his religion was let go, McIntyre
J. stated:
The words of the statute speak of an "occupational requirement." This
must refer to a requirementfor the occupation, not a requirementlimited
to an individual. It must apply to all members of the employee group
concerned because it is a requirement of general applicationconcerning
the safety of employees. The employee must meet the requirementin order
to hold the employment It is, by its nature not susceptible to individual
application...

...A condition of employment does not list its character as a bona fide
occupational requirement because it may be discriminatory. Rather, if a
working condition is establishedas a bonafide occupationalrequirement
the consequentialdiscrimination,if any, ispermitted1 4 [Emphasis added]
The court went on to hold that there is no duty to accommodate where
there is a bonafide occupational requirement." 5
These words of McIntyre J. could cause considerable difficulty for an
AIDS victim trying to show discrimination by the employer at any stage
of the employment relationship. It would appear that a company policy
not to hire or retain persons with infectious diseases, or even those
suspected of having infectious diseases, could also be characterized as a
"requirement of general application concerning the safety of employee",
not something confined to the individual in question.
Even if this argument could be mitigated by reference to the very low
chances of contracting AIDS by casual contact, moreover, the case of
Canada Safeway Ltd v. Steel et a.116 may cause problems. There, the
Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench ruled that a supermarket was not
guilty of illegal discrimination of imposing a "no beards" policy on its
male employees. According to the court, the evidence presented before it
demonstrated that customers preferred the "no beards" policy and would
shop elsewhere if the policy were removed. Because of this the court
ruled that the "no beards" policy was a reasonable occupational
qualification.

112. Supra,note 82, at 72.

113. (1986), 7 C.H.R.R. D/3093 (S.C.C.).
114. Id, at 24719.
115. Id, at 24722.

116. 84 C.L.L.C, para. 17021 (Man. Q.B.).
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Thus, if employers are able to plead customer preference as a bonafide
occupational qualification on something as harmless as beards, and
succeed, what will stop them, along with fellow employees, from doing
so when the panic of AIDS is involved?
But, of course, this case is not the final word on this matter, and may
eventually be cast in doubt by the contrary decisions of other courts
outside of Manitoba. Indeed, arguments based on non-acceptance of
different races or sexes by customers and fellow employees have already
been rejected in U.S. discrimination cases. U.S. courts and tribunals have
ruled that the "uninformed prejudices of the market place" should not be
allowed to defeat law designed to eliminate racial and sexual
discrimination in employment.11 7 In addition, Canada Safeway v. Steel
only deals with sex discrimination: bonafide occupational qualifications
for handicapped individuals may be another thing completely. It is just
too early to tell what will happen on this front.
Thus, in concluding, it can be safely stated that, under Canadian
human rights legislation as it now stands, AIDS victims and the majority
of individuals in high-risk groups can be positive of very little protection.
Not only will they frequently face uncertain chances of establishing
discrimination, but quite apart from any discussion of customer
preference, the Bhinder case may leave it open for a bona fide
occupational qualification to be found unless medical evidence comes to
the rescue.
VI. OccupationalHealthand Safety Legislation
In contrast to human rights legislation, this legislation will likely be held
up by employers, fellow employees and the proponents of quarantine as
the salvation of healthy employees. But, before any such rash claims can
be substantiated, two issues must be addressed:
(i) Whether fellow employees can invoke the statutory right to refuse
unsafe work just because they are told to work with an AIDS victim or
member of a high risk group; and
(ii) Whether an employee who contracts AIDS on the job is eligible to
receive worker's compensation.

117. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 E2d. 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971) (sex discrimination); Diaz v. PanAm World Airways Inc, 442 F 2d. 385 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), on remand, 346 FSupp. 1301 (D.FIa. 1972) (sex
discrimination); Wigginess, Inc v. Fruchtman, 482 ESupp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aft'd, 628
E 2d. 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (sex discrimination); C.E Rucker v.
HigherEduc.Aids Bd, 669 R 2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982) (racial and sex discrimination).
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With reference to the employee's right to refuse work of a dangerous
nature, Nash'1 8 notes that every province in Canada as well as the federal
jurisdiction has legislation of this nature. Three main issues are involved:
(i) Whose health or safety is at stake?
(ii) What type of danger must the worker believe to be present?
(iii) What kind of belief is required?" 9
In response to the first question, every worker who can exercise the
statutory right to refuse work may do so when his or her own health and
safety is at stake.120 When "another employee's" health and safety is at
stake.120 When "another employee's" health or safety is endangered,
Nova Scotia, Alberta, Ontario and the federal jurisdiction permit
refusal 21 , while Saskatchewan allows this when the health or safety of
any person in the workplace, employee or not, is at stake. 22 British
Columbia, Newfoundland, and Quebec, finally, go so far as allowing a
refusal when the health or safety of any person may be endangered.'23
As for the second question, different jurisdictions have differing
requirements as to what type of danger the worker must believe to be
present. The federal jurisdiction and Alberta require that a person
refusing to work believes that there is an "immanent" danger 24.
Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Quebec and the mining statutes of B.C.,
and Manitoba utilize the concept of "unusual" danger in their right to
refuse sections, but do not couple it with the idea of immanence'25. British
Columbia's Industrial Health and Safety Regulations, covering most of
the province's workers other than miners, require that an employee refuse
work which he or she believes to present an "undue" hazard to the health
or safety of any person. 26 Newfoundland and Manitoba base the right to
refuse on the belief by the worker that the work is dangerous' 2", while
Ontario and Nova Scotia 28 base it on whether it is "likely to endanger."
Finally, the type of belief required of the worker in refusing hazardous
work is usually based on an objective standard. Nash notes:

118. Michael Izumi Nash, Canadian OccupationalHealth and Safety Law Handbook, CCH
Canadian Ltd., Don Mills, Ont. (1986) para. 2305-2350.
119. Id, para. 2305.
120. Id, para. 2310.
121. Id
122. Id
123. Id
124. Id, para. 2320.
125. Id
126. B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 8.24(1).
127. Supra,note 118, para. 2335.
128. Occupational Health and Safety Act, S.N.S. 1985, c. 3. s. 22(1).
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With only two exceptions, all jurisdictions which confer to the right to
refuse unsafe work do so in situations where a worker has "reasonable
cause to believe," or simply "reason to believe" that a hazard ... exists.
The two exceptions concern the duty to refuse work found in the statutes
of Newfoundland and Alberta. In these two cases, the belief of the worker
is irrelevant; if the hazard is objectively immanent then the worker must
refuse to do the work"".
Although B.C. and the federal jurisdiction have incorporated some
aspects of the worker's own subjective belief in the determination of the
30
right to refuse,
In reality, the difference is probably more an accident resulting from the
types of cases which have been addressed than a disagreement about
substance.... Looking at the fact situations, the language used in the
three cases, and the accepted purpose of the statutory right to refuse, the
consensus of opinion is probably this:
An employee will be regardedas having had reasonablegrounds to believe
a situation is unsafe if objectively such reasonable grounds exist, and
provided that there is no reason to believe that the employee was acting
out of ulterior motives. If the reasonable grounds are not objectively
demonstrable,then the employee may show from his or her own subjective
131
point of view why he or she personally had reasonable grounds.
[Emphasis added]
With regard to AIDS, on the present medical knowledge it cannot be
objectively stated that working with an AIDS victim exposes one to
"immanent", "unusual", "undue", or "likely" danger. Indeed, the
Ontario Labour Relations Board has already considered at least one case
of whether the statutory right to refuse can be invoked by health care
workers who don't want to care for AIDS patients. Tracey TremayneLloyd, chairman of the AIDS Committee set up by the Canadian Bar
Association in Ontario is quoted as saying:
The board, I understand, held that the Act was of no benefit to the
employee in question in that case because there was, in fact, no danger to
the worker in the treatment of the patient in question, and therefore, the
refusal to work was unjustifiable...
... The Occupational Health and Safety Act expressly allows workers to
refuse work where there health and safety is in danger. But, it does not
permit refusal to work if that could place the life or health of another
person or the public at large in immanent jeopardy...
Withdrawal of services would not be found a reasonable exercise of
individual rights because the currentstate of medical knowledge suggests
that AIDS cannot be transmitted through casual contact, and that the risk
to health-careworkers is low...
129. Supra, note 118, para. 2335.
130. Id, para. 2350.
131. Id
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(This is) a reminder to health-care workers that all of them - regardless
of their rank or position or place of employment - have taken an oath in
the commitment to care. Along with this commitment to care surely goes
the acceptance of some risk. The acceptance of risk, while it may be
unspoken, is, in my submission, one that flows quite naturally from the
basic principle of the profession. 32 [Emphasis added]
A similar decision has also been made in the U.S. A recent California
case involved a complaint against a hospital which disciplined nurses for
refusing to provide routine care to AIDS patients without wearing masks
and gloves. The nurses complained that the hospital's actions violated the
relevant health and safety laws. This complaint was heard by the
California Labour Commission, which ruled that the hospital, by
following the recommendations established by the U.S. Center for
Disease Control, was within its rights in insisting that the nurses provide
133
care without masks and gloves.
Thus, it appears that the current state of medical knowledge is used to
imbue the objective standard, "reasonable cause to believe," with a
meaning that overides the subjective fear of fellow workers in the AIDS
context. Moreover, because these cases deal directly with health-care
workers, who would appear to have the highest rate of exposure, fellow
workers in other occupations would not have a legal leg to stand on, if
they refused to work with an AIDS victim or the member of a high-risk
group. The only hopes they can have, are, that the case law in the area
is "still evolving", and that other jurisdictions, notably federal and B.C.,
34
are more receptive to subjective belief arguments.
Turning, now, to the last issue, viz., whether a worker (most probably
a health-care worker) who contracted AIDS on the job can successfully
claim for workers compensation, Nash notes that in all provincial
legislation:
To be eligible for compensation payments and rehabilitation, the injured
worker must have suffered an accident or industrial disease that:
- arose out of and in the course of employment,
- disabled the worker beyond the day of the accident, and
- was not caused by the worker's 13own wilful misconduct unless a serious
disablement or fatality resulted... 5
Also,
132. Murray, T., "Refusing AIDS Patients May Cost Your Job," (1996), 22 Medical Post,
Jan. 28, 1986, at 5.
133. "California Labour Commissioner Dismisses Complaint by Nurses Treating AIDS
Victims," (1985), 15 Occupational Safety and Health Reporter 382.
134. Supra, note 118, para. 2350.
135. Id, para. 3805. AIDS will, as far as the second issue is concerned, definitely disable the
worker beyond the day of the accident.
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In order for compensation to be paid, it must first be determined:
- that there was an "accident" as defined in the worker's compensation
statute,
- that the injury and disability were caused "by reason of' the accident.
and
- that the "accident" arose out of and in the course of employment,
36
- that the accident is not excluded because of where it happened.
As for the first issue, whether acquiring AIDS on the job constitutes an
"accident", most workers' compensation statutes define an accident as
including:
(i) a wilful and intentional act, not being the act of the employee,
(ii) a chance event occasioned by a physical or natural cause, and,
137
(iii) a disablement arising out of and in the course of employment.
An AIDS victim should have no difficulty showing that an accident
occured ifhe can point to a specific event (e.g., spilling infected body
fluids on open wounds). In addition, various occupational diseases may
become easier to catch because of AIDS, so as to fit the definition. Thus,
although it may be difficult to point to a specific event in every instance
of contracting AIDS itself, it is likely that the concomitant industrial
diseases will get the victim over this legal hurdle in any event.
However, the second issue, as to whether the injury and disability of
AIDS was caused "by reason of" the accident, may be more problematic.
Due to an unknown incubation period for the disease, it may not be
possible to say that it is a medical condition which existed prior to the
accident. Of such problems Nash writes:
Where the pre-existing condition itself causes no disability, but does react
with some occupational factor to produce a disability, the W.C.B.'s will
generally award compensation for the entire disability... However, when
the pre-existing condition does cause a disability prior to the accident, the
Boards are entitled to reduce the compensation for permanent disability
138
proportionately.
Thus, depending on whether or not AIDS has resulted in some
disability prior to the "accident", the victim may find his compensation
reduced. The problem is that he may not know this until he has
contracted some industrial disease, 139 in fact, it may not come up at all' 40 .
Hence, what is really at issue here is whether occupational diseases made
easier to catch because of AIDS should result in a proportional reduction
136. Id, para. 3810.
137. Id, para. 3815.
138. Id, para. 3820.
139. That is, unless some form of testing program is in place, or his doctor has informed him
of his condition.
140. Even if the claimant knew he had AIDS, it would be to the advantage of his claim if he
could conceal it and pursue the claim for the debilitating industrial disease alone.
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of the compensation awarded. This will depend on whether there has
been a diagnosis or positive AIDS test presented to the board, and
whether the term "pre-existing disability" is interpreted as including a
partial or total disablement of the immune system. 141
The third issue, as to whether the accident "arose out of and in the
course of employment", presents perhaps the most difficult problem for
claimants - at least so long as they are making a claim for AIDS
contracted on the job. Considering that the most frequent ways of
contracting the disease involve sexual intercourse, intravenous drug use
and blood transfusions, it is not likely that these are activities usually
carried on during working hours in the course of an employee's duties.
Indeed, they may well amount to wilful misconduct disqualifying the
employee from entitlement to compensation. Health-care workers may
have a better case because they can be required to handle infected body
fluids in their course of employment, but nobody else.
As for occupational diseases that AIDS sufferers contract on the job,
however, again so long as the "accident" happens while the employee is
on the job or properly on the job site, it is covered under this heading.
The fourth requirement, where the accident happened, is jurisdictional
in nature and should pose no problem if the victim is properly advised as
142
to which board to consult.
Finally, some mention must be made of the ubiquitous schedules of
industrial diseases found in provincial workers' compensation statutes.
Generally,
When a worker suffers from one of the listed diseases while having
worked in the appropriate listed occupation, it is presumed that the
employee's injury arose out of the employment. In the few cases where
no occupation is listed with a particular disease any employee suffering
hat disease will be presumed to have contracted it as a result of
employment...
If a worker has contracted a disease not mentioned in the Schedule then
the Board may have to decide the case on an individual basis. Ordinarily,
such a process would require the claimant to prove a disability, that the
disability resulted from an industrial disease, and that harmful exposure at
work caused the industrial disease. In an effort to make adjudication of
these complex cases somewhat simpler, the W.C.B.'s have developed their
own internal guidelines for recognizing a limited number of industrial
diseases...
All other cases not dealt with in a schedule or guideline must be decided
on the available evidence and without the benefit of presumption.In most
141. Which, logically, it should, as what other disease so neatly fits the term "pre-existing
condition causing disability prior to the accident", when the worker in question probably
would not have got the industrial disease without the disability caused by AIDS?
142. Supra,note 118, para. 3830.

610 The Dalhousie Law Journal

provinces, the onus is on the employee to prove that the disease is an
industrialdiseaseand that it arose out of the employment This means that
it is up to the worker to find and present the evidence necessary for the
Board to make afavorable conclusion... Without the benefit of a board
guideline or a schedule entry which applies to a claimant'scase, the odds
are statistically against a successful claim. Ontario has the highest rate of
recognizing industrial diseases on the North American continent and yet
Ontario's rate is only 40 per cent of Sweden's despite the fact that
industrial conditions are very similar in the two jurisdictions. 43 [Emphasis
added]
With comments like these, unless AIDS is eventually recognized as an
industrial disease, it appears highly unlikely that persons who contract
AIDS on the job will ever receive workers' compensation on that basis.
It is ironic, however, that the industrial diseases made so much easier to
catch because of the AIDS infection will be compensible, at least, in part.
Thus, it can be concluded that occupational health and safety
legislation offers AIDS victims, high-risk groups, and fellow workers a
mixed bag when it comes to results. Absent the termination of employees
with AIDS it appears that fellow employees cannot refuse to work with
them. This potentially sets up a situation of direct confrontation with the
employer and high-risk groups caught in the centre of an emotional
storm. As for workers' compensation, it appears that AIDS itself is not
likely to be seen as compensible, but the industrial diseases that it
facilitates will.
VII. Conclusion
AIDS is a disease that presents many challenges to employers,
employees, and the law itself. This paper has been a survey of what the
current law can do, both for AIDS victims and members of high-risk
groups, as well as the fellow employees who are afraid to work with
them.
The AIDS victims themselves face uncertain but developing legal
protections in the face of employment discrimination. While the common
law and arbitration jurisprudence offers, at most, either reliance on an
employer's good will or reassignment to another job, the possibility of
termination is always there. They cannot even hide their illness. Human
rights legislation, on the other hand, shows much room for development.
If the Canadian definition of handicapped is interpreted in the same way
as the much more detailed provisions in the U.S., AIDS victims may
have recourse to human rights tribunals and courts.

143. Id, para. 3840-3845.
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But, unfortunately, it is not quite that simple. Just as likely as a
favorable interpretation of "handicapped" is a wide definition of "bona
fide occupational qualification" that would make clean health a
prerequisite to holding a job. If this is the case, AIDS victims will have
a very difficult time indeed under the human rights legislation.
However, the story is not completely one-sided. Fellow workers who
fear for their safety might be able to refuse work under the collective
agreement in certain narrowly defined circumstances. But, because of the
objective standard used under occupational health and safety legislation
and the common law, the present state of medical knowledge will work
against any such refusal being found reasonable, with discipline as the
likely result. This situation is made worse by the fact that, if they contract
AIDS on the job, workers' compensation is probably out of the question.
High-risk groups may become embroiled in discriminatory actions as
well, and, with the exception of a minority, (e.g., Haitians), most will
have no protection against actions ranging from harassment to
termination.
Where the situation arises that an employer, in his discretion, wishes to
keep an AIDS victim on the job, the lack of any right to refuse in the
fellow employees may lead to tension and interpersonal problems.
Although dismissal of the other employees is legally allowed, the author
feels that education of the other employees to the real risks of contracting
AIDS isthe answer.
Where, however, an AIDS victim or a member of a high-risk group is
terminated, there is likely very little he can legally do. It is thus
recommended that both homosexuality and AIDS be included in the
human rights legislation of all Canadian jurisdictions to at least give those
people a fighting chance.

